Minutes - Executive Policy Committee – July 19, 2006

Minute No. 575
Report - Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services - July 10, 2006

Item No. 1 Neighbourhood Safety and Crime Prevention
File GF-2

EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executive Policy Committee did not concur in the recommendation of the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services and recommends to Council:

1. That the report from the Chief of Police dated June 30, 2006 be received as information.

2. That the Administration be directed to implement and deploy the proposed Clean Sweep Street Crime Task Force and the related Crime Analysis Unit as soon as possible.

3. That commencing in 2006, that increased Highway Traffic Act fine revenue collected by the City with respect to the recent announcement made by the Province of Manitoba, be dedicated as a funding source for expenses that will be incurred relating to the Clean Sweep Task Force and the related Crime Analysis Unit.

4. That for the 2006 costs incurred for the Clean Sweep Task Force and the related Crime Analysis Unit, no further funding beyond the above noted source be requested by the Winnipeg Police Service

5. That the Administration be directed to provide to the Executive Policy Committee a quarterly report concerning the financial status of the program.

6. That the Administration be directed to report back to the Executive Policy Committee and the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services on the following:

    A. How the permanent complement of police officers will expand with the implementation of these above noted two units in addition to the officers hired over the past two years with casino revenues and how these new police officers impact the City operating budgets over the forthcoming three years;

Report - Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services - July 10, 2006

B. What, if any additional, resources will be required to develop and implement a COMPSTAT style management and accountability mechanism where that will provide weekly updates to citizens on crime trends on a geographical basis across each of the Police Districts and propose how the existing Police command structure with its specialized operational units can be augmented by weekly organizational and strategy meetings chaired by the Chief of Police to respond to crime and safety concerns across each geographical district and coordinate Clean Sweep Task Force Operations.

C. How the Administration proposes to measure Police Service outcomes related to crime prevention and enhancement of neighbourhood safety.

7. That the Proper Officers of the City be authorized to do all things necessary to implement the intent of the foregoing.

Minutes - Executive Policy Committee – July 19, 2006

Report - Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services – July 10, 2006

DECISION MAKING HISTORY:

Moved by Councillor Steeves,
That the recommendation of the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services not be concurred in.

Carried

Moved by Councillor Steeves,
WHEREAS crime and safety are top priorities for the citizens of Winnipeg;

AND WHEREAS the Clean Sweep Street Crime Task Force Operation has been successful in delivering a visible show of force against crime on the street in neighbourhoods with crime and safety problems;

AND WHEREAS citizens have responded favourably to the increased police presence in areas where Clean Sweep Operations are being conducted;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Executive Policy Committee does not concur with the recommendation of the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services, and recommends to Council:

1. That the report from the Chief of Police dated June 30, 2006 be received as information.

2. That the Administration be directed to implement and deploy the proposed Clean Sweep Street Crime Task Force and the related Crime Analysis Unit as soon as possible.

3. That commencing in 2006, that increased Highway Traffic Act fine revenue collected by the City with respect to the recent announcement made by the Province of Manitoba, be dedicated as a funding source for expenses that will be incurred relating to the Clean Sweep Task Force and the related Crime Analysis Unit.

4. That for the 2006 costs incurred for the Clean Sweep Task Force and the related Crime Analysis Unit, no further funding beyond the above noted source be requested by the Winnipeg Police Service

5. That the Administration be directed to provide to the Executive Policy Committee a quarterly report concerning the financial status of the program.

Report - Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services – July 10, 2006

DECISION MAKING HISTORY (continued):

6. That the Administration be directed to report back to the Executive Policy Committee and the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services on the following:

   C. How the permanent complement of police officers will expand with the implementation of these above noted two units in addition to the officers hired over the past two years with casino revenues and how these new police officers impact the City operating budgets over the forthcoming three years;

   D. What, if any additional, resources will be required to develop and implement a COMPSTAT style management and accountability mechanism where that will provide weekly updates to citizens on crime trends on a geographical basis across each of the Police Districts and propose how the existing Police command structure with its specialized operational units can be augmented by weekly organizational and strategy meetings chaired by the Chief of Police to respond to crime and safety concerns across each geographical district and coordinate Clean Sweep Task Force Operations.

   C. How the Administration proposes to measure Police Service outcomes related to crime prevention and enhancement of neighbourhood safety.

Carried

STANDING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION:

On July 10, 2006, the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services concurred in the administrative recommendation (contained in the report from the Chief of Police dated June 30, 2006) and submitted the matter to the Executive Policy Committee and Council.

EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION:

On May 17, 2006, the Executive Policy Committee passed the following motion, namely:

WHEREAS neighbourhood safety and crime prevention is a paramount concern for the citizens of Winnipeg as highlighted by the remarks of several citizens who spoke out at the recent Winnipeg City Summit;

AND WHEREAS “Operation Clean Sweep” has been successful in placing a focused law enforcement presence in neighbourhoods of high public safety concern;

Report - Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services - July 10, 2006

DECISION MAKING HISTORY (continued):

EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION (continued):

AND WHEREAS "Operation Clean Sweep" has become a permanent law enforcement operational tool in Winnipeg to combat and prevent crime;

AND WHEREAS the permanent deployment of a street crime unit will allow for rapid response of law enforcement resources to high needs areas or a neighbourhood with emerging problems;

AND WHEREAS citizen perception of safety in their neighbourhood will be enhanced by timely public access to information;

AND WHEREAS The City of Winnipeg and the Winnipeg Police Service are desirous of being accountable to the people of Winnipeg for delivering measurable results to the citizens and taxpayers of Winnipeg

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Chief Administrative Officer report back to the Standing Policy Committee of Protection and Community Services on or before July 10, 2006, on a comprehensive proposal to address the future neighbourhood safety and crime prevention needs of the City of Winnipeg;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Proposal focus on the safety and crime prevention needs of citizens and neighbourhoods with special emphasis on proactive enforcement and crime suppression techniques, incorporating current best practices in policing including:

1. Intelligence Led Policing (COMPSTAT Accountability Model)
    A. The gathering, compilation and analysis of intelligence from all available sources as the basis for proactive targeted enforcement strategies in terms of both police deployment and strategic approaches in relation to identified high crime areas, hotspots, and specific individuals involved in criminal activity on an ongoing basis;

    B. The regular reporting back by senior officers to the Chief on crime and safety in their respective neighbourhoods on their success in reducing crime and public access to the information being gathered on crime and safety statistics on a neighbourhood basis.

2. Evidence Based Policing
    A. Vigorous ongoing evaluation of strategies and approaches and the development and adoption of scientifically proven best practices based on scientific criteria;

Report - Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services - July 10, 2006

DECISION MAKING HISTORY (continued):

EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION (continued):

B. Scientific measurement of police effectiveness based primarily on "outcomes" as opposed to "outputs."

3. Community Based Policing
   A. Building upon existing Police Service community outreach efforts to work with community organizations to ensure local concerns and needs are understood when resource deployment decisions are made by the Service and that a high level of transparency in crime and safety indices being made available to the public
   B. The formation of partnerships with academic research entities and other related stakeholders.

RE:	**Neighborhood Safety and Crime Prevention Report (File GF-2)**
FOR SUBMISSION TO:	**Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services**
ORIGINAL REPORT SIGNED BY:	**J.J. Ewatski, Chief of Police**
REPORT DATE:	**2006/06/30**
RECOMMENDATION:	**That the Winnipeg Police Service be directed to implement recommendations proposed within the comprehensive report addressing neighborhood safety and crime prevention needs and that Council identify a source of funding**

Report Summary

The Winnipeg Police Service is committed to the crime prevention, crime reduction, crime investigation, and general service needs of the citizens of Winnipeg. Service will be delivered using a combination of traditional methods and contemporary methods aligned with problem-oriented community policing, intelligence led policing, and research backed evidence based policing. Service delivery will be further enhanced with the implementation of some of the Compstat elements which have advanced new ways for police organizations to do business. Overall, the goal of the Winnipeg Police Service is to provide the best service possible by using an array of best police practices to meet the safety and crime reduction needs of the citizens of Winnipeg.

The WPS recommends the following proposal:

1. Implementation of a permanent task force-rapid response team to address criminal hotspots and neighborhood problems
2. The revitalization of the crime analysis unit—including an upgrade of the crime analysis computer system; and the necessary analytical and clerical staff to maintain the system
3. Crime prevention and crime reduction strategies will be controlled and directed by the WPS executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations
4. The Chief of Police will account for police performance to the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services through the CAO
5. Statistical information will be made available to the public through the Winnipeg Police Service Web-site

The challenge for the Winnipeg Police Service is to balance finite resources to meet community needs. The WPS has an authorized complement of 1254 police officers; currently, there are 1235 working police officers. Community needs include:

- Responding to public calls for service
- Responding to and investigating crimes
- Contributing to the solution of community and neighborhood problems
- Contributing to crime prevention strategies
- Contributing to crime reduction strategies

The WPS is committed to meet these needs.

Calls for public service account for the largest workload the WPS is responsible for. In 2005 police responded to 150,376 calls of which only 76,432 were determined to be criminal in nature. The vast majority of calls are non-criminal. A priority response workgroup comprised of officers acting in a uniformed patrol capacity is responsible for this workload. Forty-two percent of available police resources are assigned to deliver service in this area. Calls for service have steadily increased over the last three years.

Criminal investigations are comprised primarily of investigators and investigative support police personnel. Sixteen percent of available police resources are assigned to deliver service in this area. Many of these areas require a degree of specialization, training, and experience. The work is categorized into three divisions:

Division 40	**Division 41**	**Division 42**
Homicide	Sex Crimes	Commercial Crime
Major Crime	Child Abuse	Stolen Auto Unit
Organized Crime	Missing Persons	Pawn Unit
Morals Unit	Child Exploitation	Surveillance Unit
Marihuana Grow Operations Unit	High Risk Offenders Unit	Computer Forensic Unit
		Polygraph Unit

Crime prevention, crime reduction, and problem oriented community issues are addressed in several ways:

1. **Partnerships established by police support groups aligned with more traditional community based police initiatives.**

   Programs like Block Parents, Neighbourhood Watch, Citizens on Patrol, and the school resource programs are community-based partnerships. Input from the community is channeled through police liaisons established with police members assigned to support and planned response areas of the Service.

2. **Partnerships established with local universities provide research backed theory that drive police strategies aligned with evidence based police initiatives and best practices.**

   The domestic violence intervention strategy and the stolen auto strategy are two research backed strategies that have demonstrated positive crime reduction outcomes. Further research areas are being explored that will benefit academic, police, and public stakeholders.

3. **Intelligence led policing initiatives that provide new methods to rapidly address emerging crime trends and community problems. Core elements of the Compstat model outline:**

   i. Intelligence driven decision-making using the advantages that technology offers in efficiently collecting, analyzing, and disseminating crime information.

   ii. Rapidly addressing crime hot spots and problem areas—employing a task force-rapid response team to address areas of concern is the means by which the WPS can effectively deploy resources that are intelligence-led.

   iii. Organizational flexibility—enhanced by employing a task force-rapid response team that operates outside the confines of geographic command. In essence, the task force-rapid response team can be directed to any part of the city to address identified criminal hotspots or neighborhood problem areas. The task force augments the existing service delivery models of the WPS.

   iv. Internal accountability—the WPS proposes to implement a task force-rapid response team. This team of officers will be directed by, and accountable to the executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations. Simply put:

      a. The WPS executive will account for police strategies employed to deal with emerging crime hotspots and neighborhood problem areas, rather than dividing scarce resources among the six geographic command districts
      b. The WPS executive will control and deploy the task force-rapid response team as the operational mechanism to address crime hotspots and neighborhood problems. (Note: operational resources and response are not limited to the task force-rapid response team; other functionally specialized units can be seconded depending upon the problem being addressed).
      c. The WPS Chief of Police will account to the CAO for police performance.
      d. Statistical information will be publicly available on the Winnipeg Police Service Web-site.

v. Follow-up and assessment—the planned response group is ideally situated to provide the necessary follow-up to problem responses undertaken in crime

hotspots and problem areas. In addition, the crime analysis unit will also be responsible to continuously monitor and track information collected from record management and intelligence sources.

The traditional police response to calls for public service combined with contemporary intelligence led, and evidence based methods provide a balanced approach to the complexities of policing in a modern urban society. Through continued academic partnerships, the Winnipeg Police Service has begun to use social science to decide what problems need solving and what strategies will offer the best chance for success. Together with other police organizations around the world, the WPS is establishing a catalogue of best police practices that can be replicated when needed to meet the safety and crime reductions needs of the citizens of Winnipeg now and in the future.

KEY ISSUES:

The WPS is prepared to adopt some of the core elements of the Compstat model.

Intelligence driven decision-making though crime analysis—the WPS is committed to revitalize the functionality of the crime analysis unit. This will include upgrades in computer software, and the centralization of crime analysis as part of the Intelligence workgroup. Crime data capturing, analysis, dissemination, and monitoring will be the broad goals of the unit. Crime analysis product is meant to augment the effectiveness of other areas of the Service, particularly the task force-rapid response unit who will rely on analysis to identify emerging crime trends and hot spots. Currently, analyst and clerical positions are inadequate—these positions do not exist in our current complement.

Task Force-Rapid Response—this group (known as Clean Sweep during the pilot project) is a recent initiative of the Service and borrows components from the Compstat model. The proposed group will be comprised of uniformed police resources. These positions do not exist in our current complement. Additionally, much of the infrastructure and support resources do not exist in the current budget.

Accountability & Organizational Flexibility—the WPS is not resourced or structured to adopt the same accountability mechanism that NYPD and other police organizations have implemented. WPS geographic division commanders (Uniform Patrol Divisions 11 – 16) do not have the authority over sufficient functionally specialized resources to deal effectively with the criminal hotspots and neighborhood problems in their areas.

Instead, the WPS proposes to deploy a task force-rapid response team to address criminal hotspots and neighborhood problem areas. The task force will report directly the WPS executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations.

The task force will be intelligence led; resource deployment decisions will be directed by the WPS executive management team. The WPS executive management will be accountable for performance outcomes and follow-up results. The Chief of Police will report regularly to the CAO. This method enhances organizational flexibility by enabling the WPS executive to deploy a designated resource outside the confines of geographic organization of operational command.

Implications of the Recommendation(s):

General Implications

( ) None

(X) For the organization overall and/or for other departments

(X) For the community and/or organizations external to the City

( ) Involves a multi-year contract

Comment(s): Intelligence driven decision-making using the advantages that technology offers in efficiently collecting, analyzing, and disseminating crime information. When combined with a task force-rapid response unit prepared to use established best police practices to address criminal hot spots and neighborhood problems, the result is an advanced form of service that augments existing service and aligns with intelligence led initiatives like Compstat.

Policy Implications

(X) No

( ) Yes

Comment(s):

Regulatory Implications

(X) None

( ) Eliminates or reduces regulatory impact

( ) Proposes regulatory impact

Comment(s):

Environmental Implications

(X) No

( ) Yes

Comment(s):

Human Resources Implications

( ) No

(X) Yes

Comment(s):There are human resource implications related to the staffing of the task force-rapid response workgroup and the revitalization of the crime analysis unit. At the time of this report, the positions necessary to staff the task force-rapid response workgroup and parts of the crime analysis unit are not in the WPS complement.

Financial Implications

( ) Within approved current and/or capital budget

(X) Current and/or capital budget adjustment required

Comment(s): There are financial implications that are attributed to the implementation of the task force –rapid response workgroup and the revitalization of the crime analysis unit. The financial impact statement outlines associated costs.

Report

REASON FOR THE REPORT:

On May 17, 2006, the Executive Policy Committee directed the Chief Administrative Officer to report back to the Standing Policy Committee of Protection and Community Services with a comprehensive proposal to address the future neighborhood safety and crime preventions needs of the City of Winnipeg. The proposal is to focus on the safety and crime prevention needs of citizens and neighborhoods with special emphasis on proactive enforcement and crime suppression techniques, incorporating best practices in policing including:

1. Intelligence led policing
2. Compstat
3. Evidence based policing
4. Community based policing

HISTORY:

Policing approaches have evolved considerably in the last twenty years. Traditional police responses to calls for public service were considered inadequate to meet the complex needs of a modern urban society. The evolution of community policing, intelligence led policing, evidence based policing, and contemporary Compstat processes are outlined in appendix A.

DISCUSSION:

Winnipeg Police Strategy

The WPS recommends the following proposals:

1. Implementation of a permanent task force-rapid response team to address criminal hotspots and neighborhood problems

2. The revitalization of the crime analysis unit—including an upgrade of the crime analysis computer system; and the necessary analytical and clerical staff to maintain the system

3. Crime prevention and crime reduction strategies will be controlled and directed by the WPS executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations

4. The Chief of Police will account for police performance to the Standing Policy Committee on Protection and Community Services through the CAO

5. Statistical information will be made available to the public through the Winnipeg Police Service Web-site

Policing in modern urban society is complex. Police meet community needs in a variety of ways:


- Responding to public calls for service
- Responding to and investigating crimes
- Contributing to the solution of community and neighborhood problems
- Contributing to crime prevention strategies
- Contributing to crime reduction strategies

The challenge for the Winnipeg Police Service is to balance finite resources to meet community needs. The WPS has an authorized complement of 1254 police officers; currently, there are 1235 working police officers. The Service is currently structured into four broad categories:

1. Priority Response
2. Planned Response
3. Criminal Investigations
4. Support

Resources are deployed as outlined in the figure 3 chart:

Figure 3



The WPS will be expanding service into a fifth category: a task force-rapid response group. This group (commonly know during the pilot project as Operation Clean Sweep) was introduced in November 2005. Details of how this model will augment police service delivery are outlined later in this report.

The five categories provide a well-rounded service delivery to meet the crime reduction and public safety needs of the citizens of Winnipeg. While traditional police response methods are still necessary in the WPS approach, there are also elements of community-based problem solving in combination with intelligence led policing and research backed evidence based policing. The Service will also implement some of the components of the Compstat model to provide a data-driven rapid response to crime hotspots in neighborhoods throughout the City of Winnipeg.

Priority Response—this group manages 42 percent of available police resources. Typically this group is comprised of officers acting in a uniformed patrol capacity in marked two-officer patrol cars. This group is responsible for responding to public calls for service. Service calls may be criminal or non-criminal in nature. This group accounts for its responsibilities through a sophisticated record management system that mandates reports for every police response.
Planned Response—this group comprises 26 percent of the Service complement and includes officers assigned to police service centers and station duty positions. This group has been given some flexibility in hours of operation and techniques it employs to address problems. Overall planned response is responsible for:

1. Lower priority workload that does not require urgent priority response (taking crime reports)
2. Community and neighborhood problems that require problem-oriented solutions that may be viewed as traditional or non-traditional (visible foot-patrol, outreach intervention, public relations, street crime enforcement, traffic enforcement)
3. District-level criminal investigations (thefts, assaults, local robberies)
4. Local traffic enforcement

Criminal Investigations—this group comprises 16 percent of the Service complement. This group is comprised primarily of investigators and investigative support police personnel. Many of these areas require a degree of specialization, training, and experience. The group is comprised of three divisions responsible for specific areas:

Division 40
Homicide Unit
Major Crimes Unit (primarily commercial robberies)
Organized Crime Unit (includes most gang and drug related investigations)
Integrated Organized Crime Unit *
Integrated Proceeds of Crime Unit *
Moral Unit (primarily prostitution and sex-trade investigation)
Marihuana Grow Operations Unit

*Integrated unit with RCMP resources

Division 41
Sex Crimes Unit
Child Abuse Unit
High Risk Offenders Unit *
Missing Persons Unit
Child Exploitation Unit *

*Integrated units with RCMP resources

Division 42
Commercial Crime Unit (primarily fraud related crimes)
Stolen Auto Unit
Pawn Unit (primarily stolen property tracking and investigations)
Surveillance Unit
Computer Forensic Unit
Identification Unit
Polygraph Unit

Support—this group comprises 16 percent of the Service complement. This group is comprised of police personnel in a variety of support roles. These support areas maintain the infrastructure of the organization in areas like recruiting, human resource management, training, policy, and strategic initiatives. The support group also includes specialized resources that also require a degree of specialization, training, and experience:

Human Resource Management and Recruitment
Organizational Development and Policy
Community Relations (includes school resources, crime prevention, and victim services)
Training Unit
Arrest Processing Unit
Intelligence Unit (includes crime analysis, and electronic surveillance & technical support)

Special Operations Units *
Emergency Response Unit
Crisis Negotiators Unit
Bomb Unit
Crowd Management Unit
Protective Services Unit
Underwater Search & Recovery Unit
Canine Unit **
Disaster Management Unit

*Special operations units are part-time units that draw members from operations, investigations, or support when required.
**Canine unit operates as a specialty but is assigned to District 4 operations for administrative purposes.

Task Force-Rapid Response—this group is a recent initiative of the Service and borrows components from the Compstat model. The proposed group will be comprised of uniformed police resources. These positions do not exist in our current complement. Additionally, much of the infrastructure and support resources do not exist in the current budget. The primary role of the task force will be to address criminal hot spots as they emerge. Problem-oriented and intelligence-led, this group will utilize best practice techniques to rapidly address identified problem areas and problem persons. The primary goal will be to influence change through problem solving techniques that may involve crime reduction as one of many measures of output. The unit will not be subject to public calls for service workload. The unit will be augmented by a sophisticated crime analysis capability. The unit will report directly to the executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations. The task force will be directed by and accountable to the WPS executive management team. The Chief of Police will continue to account for police performance to the CAO. Additionally, statistical information will be regularly published on the Winnipeg Police Service Web-site.

The WPS is committed to the following strategies:

1. **WPS will remain committed to responding to public calls for service as effectively and efficiently as possible**

Calls for service include 911 calls and less urgent calls that are often classified as quality of life problems (panhandling, public drinking, prostitution, etc.). Resources assigned to priority response and planned response areas of the Service will handle this traditional police workload. When appropriate, calls will be assigned to planned response resources, task force-rapid response, or other civic departments to minimize the impact on priority response units. The workload is significant and justifies the share of resources currently assigned to priority response as illustrated in table 1:

Table 1

Dispatched Calls for Service & Calls Criminal in Nature (2003-2005)

			Percentage Breakdown	
	Calls for Service	**Criminal Calls***	**Criminal**	**Non-Criminal**
2003	170,158	80,105	47%	53%
2004	162,761	78,364	32%	68%
2005	153,376	76,432	30%	70%

*this is an estimated number. Many calls for service are not initially captured as criminal in nature. This estimate allows for a 10 % error variance.

Challenges—matching resources with public and Service needs continues to be the greatest challenge. The Communication Center has completed a workload analysis to determine staffing needs. Scheduling changes have resulted. The priority response group (and to some extent the planned response group) must also be examined to determine the most efficient and effective deployment of resources. Any explored scheduling changes will impact internally on:

- Policy
- Collective agreements
- Budgets

2. **WPS will remain committed to proactive crime prevention and crime reduction through community-based and evidence-based approaches:**

Programs like Block Parents, Neighbourhood Watch, Citizens on Patrol, and the school resource programs are community-based partnerships. Input from the community is channeled through police liaisons established with police members assigned to support and planned response areas of the Service. These relationships

serve to help police identify neighborhood problems and develop solutions in conjunction with the community.

The Service has had success with evidence-based approaches in the areas of domestic violence and stolen auto; it will continue to explore new partnerships that lead to research backed best practices.

Domestic Violence Intervention Program—this strategy involves partnerships with researchers from the University of Manitoba and provincial government victim service unit. Through research, this program has developed a process that involves identifying domestic partners who are at high risk. When appropriate, intervention mechanisms are delivered to persons at risk in an effort to divert domestic partners to support groups prior to the onset of violence and abuse. After an initial spike in domestic reports (which was predicted) the strategy has begun to see a decline in domestic assaults.

Stolen Auto Strategy—this strategy involves partnerships with researchers from the University of Manitoba, Manitoba Public Insurance, the Auto-21 Group, and the provincial government. Through research, this program developed a process that identifies offenders who are at high risk to offend. The strategy involves rigorous suppression of this group of high-risk offenders through enhanced curfew checks and when appropriate, incarceration. The strategy has resulted in a steady decline in auto theft in Winnipeg over the last two years.

The success of these research backed approaches provide a blueprint in the establishment of evidence based best practices to address the complex problems that challenge modern urban society. The Winnipeg Police Service continues to explore and advance continued partnership with our local universities.

Challenges—resources assigned to investigations, support, priority response and planned response all have roles in various aspects of these programs and strategies. The move to implement a task force-rapid response group puts further strain on resources. Priority response commitments (which are part of a collective agreement) have necessitated deploying planned response resources into priority response to meet minimum staffing requirements. This is in addition to increased overtime costs.

Resources assigned to planned response lack problem oriented training that would expose them to non-traditional responses. Consequently members in this area generally resort to more traditional police responses. While traditional responses to some problems are appropriate, this approach is limited. Best practices that attempt to address the root-cause of problems may be overlooked.

Some of these areas and initiatives are difficult to quantify; careful consideration is required to measure outcomes.

3. **WPS will continue to provide investigative crime support**

The WPS is well established in developing skilled investigators to conduct investigations in the many specialized crime areas. In addition, several established partnerships are in place in:

- Criminal Intelligence
- Organized Crime
- Child Exploitation
- High Risk Offenders
- Proceeds of Crime

Challenges—judicial influence and technological influence have had tremendous impact.

Judicial Influence—judicial requirement for full and timely disclosure of all documents pertaining to investigations has resulted in a heavy administrative burden that impact on priority response and investigative resources. It is a constant struggle to balance the responsibility of full and timely court disclosure against the need to have more police resources actively engaged in the field. These areas are mutually exclusive; emphasis on disclosure will be at the expense of actively engaged field resources.

Technological Influence—technological influences are partially driven by judicial influences. Statement evidence—a staple in most criminal prosecutions—is far more compelling when introduced in the form of a video statement. The court requirement for this type of corroborating evidence is such that statements recorded in writing are given far less weight and consideration in court. In response, the WPS is undertaking a technological upgrade that will see our investigative units equipped with video recording capacity. This undertaking has huge implications associated to equipment, training, and policy, and budget.

Organized crime, homicide, and major crime cases have also been further impacted by technology. The cell phone and other wireless data sharing devices, have given many criminals a degree of sophistication unheard of even ten years ago. Investigative techniques are routinely incorporating electronic surveillance as part of investigations. Costs necessary to keep pace with advances in technology are impacting the ability to successfully investigate in these areas.

4. **The WPS will implement a task force-rapid response group that will incorporate some of the components of the Compstat model**

Rapidly addressing criminal hot spots or persons is a crime reduction strategy that has had some success in other police organizations. The local Clean Sweep initiative demonstrated the ability to rapidly mobilize and concentrate resources into an

identified crime hotspot or neighborhood problem area. The WPS does not have the resources or structure to implement a Compstat model like that deployed in New York. To match the 15% increase in police complement that the NYPD was provided, the WPS would require an increase of approximately 225 police officers.

In an age of fiscal responsibility and accountability, the WPS chooses to adapt the Compstat model to augment and enhance the current service delivery model. The WPS proposes to implement a permanent task force that is accountable directly to the executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations. This adaptation focuses on organizational flexibility rather than geographic organization of operational command. In other words, the WPS executive management team will direct operational resources outside of the six district geographical structure. The notion of a weekly "Compstat meeting" holding individual district commanders accountable is moot; resources to address crime trends and neighborhood problems would be directed outside of the district command structure. Division commanders are currently accountable to the executive management team; as such, they are expected to keep abreast of the criminal trends and neighborhood problems in their areas. However, without adequate resources they cannot be held accountable to the high levels outlined in the New York Compstat model. Consequently, with the exception of geographic organization of operational command, five components of the Compstat model will be implemented:

1. **Intelligence driven decision-making though crime analysis**—the WPS is committed to revitalize the functionality of the crime analysis unit. This will include upgrades in computer software, and the centralization of crime analysis as part of the Intelligence workgroup. Crime data capturing, analysis, dissemination, and monitoring will be the broad goals of the unit. Crime analysis product is meant to augment the effectiveness of other areas of the Service, particularly the task force-rapid response unit who will rely on analysis to identify emerging crime trends and hot spots. Currently, analyst and clerical positions are inadequate—these positions do not exist in our current complement.

2. **Rapidly addressing crime hot spots and problem areas**—employing a task force-rapid response team to address areas of concern is the means by which the WPS can effectively deploy resources that are intelligence-led without expanding too far beyond the confines of existing budgetary and resource constraints. At the same time, a task force approach will mitigate some of the problems other cities have experienced when implementing Compstat approaches, particularly in the areas of geographic command and control, and organizational flexibility.

3. **Organizational flexibility**—enhanced by employing a task force-rapid response team that operates outside the confines of geographic command. In essence, the task force-rapid response team can be directed to any part of the city to address identified criminal hotspots or neighborhood problem areas. The task force

augments the existing service delivery models of priority response and planned response.

4. **Internal accountability**—the WPS proposes to implement a task force-rapid response team. This team of officers will be directed by, and accountable to the executive management team under the Deputy Chief of Operations. Simply put:

    a. The WPS executive will account for police strategies employed to deal with emerging crime hotspots and neighborhood problem areas, rather than dividing scarce resources among the six geographic command districts

    b. The WPS executive will control and deploy the task force-rapid response team as the mechanism to address crime hotspots and neighborhood problems. (Note: operational resources and response are not limited to the task force-rapid response team; other functionally specialized units can be seconded depending upon the problem being addressed).

    c. The WPS Chief of Police will account to the CAO for police performance.

    d. Statistical information will be publicly available on the Winnipeg Police Service Web-site.

5. **Follow-up and assessment**—the planned response group is ideally situated to provide the necessary follow-up to problem responses undertaken in crime hotspots and problem areas. In addition, the crime analysis unit will also be responsible to continuously monitor and track information collected from record management and intelligence sources.

Challenges—resources currently assigned to crime analysis lack the equipment and training to take on extensive crime data capturing, analysis, or dissemination. A project proposal designed to move the crime analysis unit forward is underway but will take several months to be operational. WPS will also explore the feasibility of implementing a central report unit responsible for the quality of reported information. This in an integral part of the Compstat data component; additionally, it is a responsibility to our Justice partners who rely on police disclosure to prosecute criminal cases.

Resources assigned to the task force-rapid response group lack problem oriented training that would expose them to non-traditional responses. Consequently members in this area generally resort to more traditional police responses. While traditional responses to some problems are appropriate, this approach is limited. Best practices that attempt to address the root-cause of problems may be overlooked.

Currently, resources assigned to planned response are often deployed into priority response units to meet minimum resource requirements as outlined in the collective agreement between the WPS and the Winnipeg Police Association.

In summary, despite what appear to be impressive results in New York, Compstat has not revolutionized the way police organizations conduct business. Instead, Compstat has offered some new ways of doing business. (An analysis of the Comstat model is attached as Appendix B). Change is occurring, but at a much slower, evolving pace than stated by many Compstat advocates. Individual police organizations must do their best to balance resources to meet the complex and competing needs of crime reduction and other calls for public service that are currently the responsibility of the police. The WPS proposes to adopt elements of the Compstat model that will enhance service delivery within the existing organizational structure of the Winnipeg Police Service and the corporate structure of the City of Winnipeg.

The Winnipeg Police Service is committed to deliver the best possible service. The traditional police response to calls for public service combined with contemporary intelligence led, and evidence based methods provide a balanced approach to the complexities of policing in a modern urban society. Through continued academic partnerships, the Winnipeg Police Service has begun to use social science to decide what problems need solving and what strategies will offer the best chance for success. Together with other police organizations around the world, the WPS is establishing a catalogue of best police practices that can be replicated when needed to meet the safety and crime reductions needs of the citizens of Winnipeg now and in the future.

Financial Impact Statement **Date:** June 29, 2006

Project Name: Operation Clean Sweep **First Year of Program** **2006**

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Capital					
Capital Expenditures Required	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -
Less: Existing Budgeted Costs	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Capital Budget Required	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -
Funding Sources:					
Debt - Internal	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -
Debt - External	-	-	-	-	-
Grants (Enter Description Here)	-	-	-	-	-
Reserves, Equity, Surplus	-	-	-	-	-
Other - Enter Description Here	-	-	-	-	-
Total Funding	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -
Total Additional Capital Budget Required	$ -				
Total Additional Debt Required	$ -				
Current Expenditures/Revenues					
Direct Costs - Salaries and Benefits	$ 1,090,575	$ 1,944,063	$ 2,468,938	$ 2,916,883	$ 3,381,758
Direct Costs - Equipment/Vehicles	$ 546,045	$ 79,989	$ 81,589	$ 83,221	$ 84,885
Less: Incremental Revenue/Recovery	-	-	-	-	-
Net Cost/(Benefit)	$ 1,636,620	$ 2,024,052	$ 2,550,527	$ 3,000,104	$ 3,466,643
Less: Existing Budget Amounts	-	-	-	-	-
Net Budget Adjustment Required	$ 1,636,620	$ 2,024,052	$ 2,550,527	$ 3,000,104	$ 3,466,643

Additional Comments: Assumptions: Numbers based from Operation Clean Sweep report dated June 23/06. (Structure C with additional Clerk A and research analyst.) Assume start date of Sept 1/06 at full complement. Assume 2% increase in salaries and costs per year. All purchases of additional equipment/vehicles t occur in 2006 with additional funding. A contingency of $400,000 in 2006 has been provided for potential callouts to support resources in task force rapid response. An allocation of $100,000 has been made for analytical software.

original signed by Ron Smolik
Manager of Finance & Administration

IN PREPARING THIS REPORT THERE WAS:

Internal Consultation With and Concurrence By:

Corporate Finance Division

External Consultation With:

THIS REPORT SUBMITTED BY:

Winnipeg Police Service
Organizational Development & Support Division
Inspector Danny Smyth

APPENDIX 'A'

Community Based Policing

Community policing is generally viewed as on organizational philosophy; a police approach that promotes community, government, and police partnerships. It often involves proactive problem solving designed to address specific community or neighborhood problems. In addition, it attempts to address causes of crime, fear of crime, and other community quality of life issues by engaging the community for input and feedback. Two of the core components of community policing are:

1. Community partnerships—joint efforts between law enforcement agencies and the community to address crime and quality of life issues.
2. Problem Solving—a process for analyzing a problem from several perspectives in order to develop strategies that are likely to succeed in reducing or eliminating the problem.

Simply put, it is a sharing in the delivery of police services between various levels of government, the community (which includes business and private sector interests), and the police.

One of the greatest challenges to community policing is entrenched cultural values that view police and police services as work that should be conducted in isolation from the general public. Many people within the community want and expect a quality of life that includes enhanced public safety and low crime rates. Crime prevention and crime reduction strategies are largely left as a police responsibility with little community involvement. Others feel a need for more community involvement in crime prevention and reduction strategies with more emphasis on community input, transparency, and a greater police visibility within the community. Finally, in an age of constraints and increased accountability, many are reluctant to increase police budgets into an area that is often difficult to measure the success of proactive initiatives.

Intelligence Led Policing

Intelligence-led policing means different things to different people. The concept emerged in the early 1990's with some of the earliest references of the term arising in the United Kingdom as a response to rising crime rates in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The traditional reactive model of policing was largely viewed as ineffective in coping with the rapid changes in technology and globalization and the effects these influences were having on crime. "Police were losing the battle on the streets and public confidence with it" (Ratcliffe, 2003). Pressure was exerted on police to become more effective and more cost-efficient. A call for increased efficiency and new strategies for dealing with crime more effectively was the subject of a number of public audits. The

1993 United Kingdom Audit Commission Report is widely recognized as the impetus for what is now regarded as intelligence-led policing.

The report focused on three central tenets:

1. Existing roles and levels of accountability
2. Police failing to make the best use of resources
3. More emphasis on tackling criminals rather than focusing on crimes

Often thought to be self-evident, intelligence-led policing can be defined as the application of criminal intelligence analysis as a rigorous decision making tool to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies. Three structures (criminal environment, intelligence and the decision maker) and three processes (interpret, influence and impact) are identified as necessary for an intelligence-led policing model to work.

The Criminal Environment—the first stage of the model is being able to interpret the criminal environment. This is usually performed by an intelligence section or unit and relies on a range of sources both within and external to the police service. The goal is to recognize criminal situations that may be comprised of different structures and different memberships and develop strategies to change or influence the situation.


Intelligence—the second stage involves developing intelligence that has an influence on the decision makers. This requires the ability to sell and promote the intelligence to the decision maker. Intelligence can be viewed as a structure, a process, and a product. In most police services an intelligence unit is responsible for the intelligence process: “a continuous cycle of tasking, data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback” (Ratcliffe, 2003). This intelligence product is intended to influence leadership ranks and the operational resources they control.

Impacting of the Criminal Environment—intelligence-led policing requires decision makers—be they division commanders or front-line sergeants—being able to have the skills to explore ways to reduce crime and have a positive impact on the criminal environment. In this regard, intelligence-led policing is closely associated to problem-oriented policing. Both are strategies that support the broad philosophy of community based policing while retaining an evidence-based element. That said, the drive-towards intelligence-led policing must be tempered with realistic expectations. The ability of the police to impact on crime levels is limited; collaboration with outside agencies is necessary if long-term crime reduction is to be achieved. Partnerships with various levels of government, local business groups, housing authorities, health, education, and social agencies are all necessary to impact on the causal factors associated with crime.

In general, intelligence-led policing strives for greater efficiency in policing. The aim of intelligence-led policing concentrates on four elements:

1. Targeting offenders (especially active criminals)
2. Management of crime and disorder hot-spots
3. Investigation of linked serial crimes and incidents
4. The application of preventative measures including partnerships with outside agencies to reduce crime and disorder

Figure 1 – Intelligence-led and crime reduction process



Evidence Based Policing


Evidence-based medicine emerged as a movement in the mid 1990s to bring a more scientific approach to seemingly random differences in surgical techniques and clinical practice in hospitals. The reforms were spearheaded by the York-based Cochrane centre, overseeing the first international database of randomized controlled trials to inform and improve medical practice. Criminologist Larry Sherman then applied this evidence-based concept into the field of policing. “Sherman noted that most police practices remain untested. We often do not know whether what we do works at all. In many cases, even after research has shown that something doesn't work, we continue to do it as a result of political pressure, inertia, or ignorance” (Jensen, 2006).

The evidence-based model can be applied to all facets of policing, including resource allocation, deployment, and investigation strategy. When confronted with an issue or problem, the evidence-based process establishes specific outcomes or goals and takes the following steps to determine the outcomes:

1. Determine best practices as identified in relevant literature
2. Adapt best practices to fit the particularities of local laws, policies, and community realities
3. Utilize the experience, skill, and political savvy of police managers to determine what practice will work in the real world
4. Formulate strategy with outputs or means to accomplish tasks
5. Develop a means of measuring whether the strategy actually works

It is important to note that outputs and outcomes are distinct. A process that involves ongoing measurement and assessment is necessary to determine outcomes and the success or failure of a particular strategy. Practices are constantly refined and updated as a result of the feedback loop (Jensen, 2006).

Figure 2 – Evidence Based Police Model



Best practices are often determined through academic research. “Universities and colleges serve most communities and can be a tremendous evidence-base resource, from compiling and assessing research, to assisting in formulating outputs, to measuring outcomes. In fact, establishing collaboration with a local academic institution can be a win-win situation: the police benefit from the labor and expertise of the faculty and students, while the university gains a laboratory in which to conduct meaningful research (Jenson, 2006). Critical to the process is scientifically proven best practices and accurate measures that are scientifically valid.

Compstat Model

Compstat models came into existence in the early 1990’s as an offshoot of intelligence-led and community-based policing initiatives. An analysis of the model is contained in appendix B.

APPENDIX 'B'

Compstat Model Analysis

Compstat Models came into existence in the early 1990's as an offshoot of intelligence-led and community-based policing initiatives. New York Police Commissioner William Bratton introduced the model in 1994. Compstat gained worldwide recognition within a few short years after New York claimed significant crime reduction demonstrated in all major crime categories the NYPD tracked throughout New York's 76 precincts. It is largely believed that the Compstat model was behind the dramatic reduction in crime. Compstat—an abbreviated acronym for computer comparison of statistics—embraces technology by capturing crime data and using sophisticated computer software to compile, analyze, and disseminate criminal information efficiently so that it can be rapidly acted upon in field operations. Although the computer generated statistics is often the most visible and widely reported component of the Compstat model, it is only part of the overall model. The Compstat model can be broken down into six core elements:

Mission clarification—top management is responsible for clarifying the core features of the organization's mission and reason for existence. In New York's case, the mission was stated with specific goals that leaders could be held accountable for.

Internal accountability—operational commanders are held accountable for knowing their commands, being well acquainted with the problems in the command, and accomplishing measurable results in reducing those problems.

Geographic organization of operational command—operational command is focused on territories or districts; decision-making authority for police operations is delegated to district commanders. Functionally differentiated units and specialists—general patrol, community officers, detectives, vice, narcotics, and traffic—are placed under district command authority and made available to district commanders as needed.

Organizational flexibility—the organization has the capacity of changing established routines as needed to mobilize resources when and where they are needed for strategic application.

Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of department's problem solving efforts—data is made available to identify and analyze crime and quality of life problems as they emerge. Analysis is also used to track and assess the impact of the police strategic response to problems.

Innovative problem-solving tactics—police responses are based on evidence-based best practices that offer the best prospects of success. Innovation and experimentation is encouraged.

The dramatic turnaround in crime reduction and focus on quality of life concerns has placed New York at the fore of a police strategic management approach that is arguably responsible for revolutionizing policing. Within five years of the implementation of New York's Compstat approach, a third of large police departments in America (those with one hundred or more sworn officers) had implemented some form of the Compstat model. A decade later the number of police services implementing Compstat-like models continues to increase.

The success of the Compstat model has been widely reported. However, a review of research literature suggests Compstat's success is primarily anecdotal or centered on the success of New York's crime reduction. New York's success with Compstat is very compelling; however, it is important to note that the New York Police Department is the "largest and, by any measure, most exceptional police department" (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003) in the United States. Just prior to Compstat implementation, New York legislators passed Safe Street legislation; consequently the New York Police Department complement increase by approximately 6000 officers over the next five years—a 15% increase in police resources augmented by a sophisticated crime analysis system.

In truth, limited academic research has been conducted, and little is actually know about how Compstat operates or what problems have been encountered by organizations outside of New York who have attempted to implement the model. In 2003 the U.S. Department of Justice and the Police Foundation sponsored a study that analyzed the results of Compstat implementation in three American cities:

- Lowell, Massachusetts; 260 police officers serving a population of 105,668
- Minneapolis, Minnesota; 919 police officers serving a population of 386,726
- Newark, New Jersey; 1445 police officers serving a population of 275,823

Criminologists associated to George Mason University, the University of Massachusetts, and the University of Maryland conducted the research. The methodology primarily involved feedback from surveys, field observations, and formal field interviews. The purpose of the research was to "identify patterns of organizational change and program content, and to distinguish departments' individual successes, failures, surprises, and disappointments with Compstat" (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003).

Focusing on Compstat's six core elements, researchers drew the following conclusions:

Mission clarification—based on the premise that mission statements must include specific crime reduction terms and the organization and its leaders must be accountable to those terms.

The research suggests the importance of the mission statement to be overstated. Data revealed:

- Establishing specific terms for crime reduction may not preferable
- Mission statements that conflict with other organizational goals may generate disaffection among those they are intended to inspire

The Minneapolis Police Department declared a 10% crime reduction goal (modeling after New York) when it implemented Compstat. In addition management instituted department-wide Compstat training and a specific set of operational tactics designed to help meet crime reduction goals. By contrast, Lowell and Newark declared general commitment to crime reduction. Despite these changes, "patrol officers surveyed in Minneapolis appeared less committed –or at best, ambivalent—to the Compstat mission" (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003) compared to officers in Lowell and Newark. Minneapolis had placed a great importance on community-oriented policing that was now forced to compete for limited police resources. Those assigned to community policing initiatives felt disenfranchised.

Ultimately, mission statement are only one way to affect cultural change and commitment. Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd concluded:

> "Should a department adopt a mission statement to foster commitment to reducing crime, it might be unnecessary to announce a specific percentage goal. Any kind of Compstat-related statement underscoring the importance of crime reduction, no matter how ambitious, vague, or implicit, will resonate equally well with members of the organization…The more an organization that is responsible for a variety of important tasks focuses all of its energies on only one goal, the more likely it is that the goal will be met with disaffection among those whom it is intended to inspire"(2003).

Internal Accountability—Compstat is structured so that operational commanders are responsible for addressing and ultimately reducing crime; ostensibly those who fail to meet crime reduction goals suffer adverse career consequences.

The research fieldwork showed that Compstat meetings "were a very effective mechanism for making district commanders…feel directly accountable for their performance" (Willis, Mastorfski, and Weisburd, 2003). The Compstat meetings are structured so that they are very public. District commanders are held accountable for their performance in front of their peers. Public censure was seen to be a much stronger

motivator than any form of praise. In fact, the pressure to perform and the emphasis on crime control—lest commanders be publicly admonished—had unintended consequences:

- The atmosphere at the meetings was more often confrontational and tension filled rather than collaborative or innovative. Many commanders were reluctant to comment on another commanders performance in any discussions for fear that peers would take comments too critically and take umbrage and revenge when it was their turn on the “hotseat”.
- Many view the process as one that centers on punishment. Research suggests that punishments, and for that matter rewards, are largely limited to public praise or rebuke. Many Compstat backers are quick to point out that 76% of NYPD district commanders retired after the first year of Compstat. However, it should be noted that Bratton was committed to replacing the NYPD old guard in a police culture that was viewed as apathetic when he took over as police commissioner. He used the Compstat meetings to focus attention on commander performance and make life for the entrenched old guard unpleasant. Many did in fact retire making room for more aggressive up-and-coming performers.

In the case of Lowell, Minneapolis, and Newark, top executives also had the power to transfer or encourage retirement. Rarely was this power exercised. One important fact to remember in smaller departments: the pool of qualified candidates to replace division commanders is limited. In addition, transmitting accountability to line officers is weakened considerably because:

- Front line officers rarely participate in the meetings.
- Commanders are the ones being held accountable for performance resulting in most strategies being directed by the commanders. Front line officers are merely following orders.
- Union structure—which often includes a collective working agreement—prevents performance-punishment mechanisms from being implemented in lower ranks.

Geographic organization of operational command—Compstat advocates management accountability; however, if district commanders are to be held accountable, they must be given the means by which to carry out the mission. Commanders must be empowered through the concept of geographical organization of operational command. In other words, organizations must put a higher priority on commanders who specialize in territory rather than those who specialize in function. District commanders must be afforded a larger share of resources to control. They must have specialized units—like detectives, school resource officers, drug units, or traffic units—placed under their command or made available to them when needed. Without a geographic command structure that gives district commanders adequate resources—including functionally specialized resources—district commanders cannot be held to as high a level of accountability as Compstat suggests.

Organizational flexibility—adequate resources that can respond rapidly and effectively is a key element of Compstat. Yet most police services are designed in ways that restrict their capacity for flexibility:

- Bureaucratic rules and regulations restrict organizations from utilizing flexibility.
- Collective working agreements bargained for by police unions also prevent police management from changing work shifts or job assignments
- Outside influence from politicians, businesses, the press, or neighborhood associations can also impact an organization's flexibility by influencing officer deployment.

Efforts to overcome the constraints that prevent greater organizational flexibility have included:

- Bargaining for more flexible shift assignments in collective agreements
- Increasing overtime budgets to allow managers to work around shift restraints
- Creating specialized units or taxi squads that are not bound to a specific geographical area or work shift

Ironically, researchers discovered that Compstat's emphasis on geographical organization of operational command and accountability contributed to a decrease in organizational flexibility. District commanders were far less likely to offer up resources to another district in need of additional resources to deal with a specific problem. In fact, many district rivalries were observed during the study. Compstat's emphasis on accountability "encouraged competition, not collaboration, among officers (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003).

Data-driven problem identification and assessment—the collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime statistics and information is critical to the Compstat process in that it informs and drives decisions on how police will respond to emerging crime trends.

The research indicates that decision making in the Compstat structure was "concentrated at the command level and was informed, but not driven, by data analysis" (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003). Sophisticated crime analysis programs did identify emerging crime trends in a timely way, however, most district commanders tended to "rely upon their personal experience and anecdotal evidence to assess and respond to problems" (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003). Once again, ironically, the Compstat process precipitated a form of reactive policing that runs counter to advocates of strategic problem solving.

Some of the other problems encountered:

- Insufficient resources to adequately organize, aggregate, or analyze crime data (often resources struggled to keep up with data input, leaving no time for more extensive analysis).
- Data reliability was a concern in the cities examined; very few systematic checks were in place to ensure reliable data was being used. All three cities utilized a shift supervisor who was generally responsible for ensuring data content and quality; all experienced reporting problems that could impact upon data reliability
- Data selection—crimes that did not meet the criteria for Compstat meeting were often unofficially relegated to a lesser or secondary status. “It was unlikely that a district commander would be held to the same high level of accountability for a crime that was not on the Compstat screen” (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003).
- Data maps—crime maps played an integral part at Compstat meetings, but were far less important in driving district crime strategies. Fieldwork “revealed that the level of analysis performed by a department’s crime analysis unit in preparation for Compstat was much more sophisticated than the daily analysis conducted by districts” (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003).

Researchers were not surprised by the reactive nature of the Compstat process. Willis, Mastofski, and Weisburd attribute this to two interrelated factors:

1. District commanders and middle managers receive no formal training in crime analysis
2. More importance is attributed to rapid availability of data and knowledge of individual cases rather than to the quality of crime analysis. Most analysis was not the kind of in-depth research approach advocated by proponents of evidence-based research.

I**nnovative, problem-solving tactics**—“despite its central purpose of crime reduction, Compstat’s relationship to innovative, problem-solving tactics is probably the least developed element in the existing Compstat literature” (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003). Evidence-based policing advocates innovation and experimentation in an effort to find the best knowledge and practices to resolve crime problems. “Police are expected to look beyond their own experiences by drawing upon knowledge gained by other departments and on innovations in theory and research about crime control and prevention” (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003). Research suggests a police reluctance to employ innovation or research-based solutions; instead preferring to rely upon traditional law enforcement tactics. This was particularly true if the department had some success with a specific tactic in the past.

One of the major contributing factors to the reluctance to try new tactics was the heavy emphasis on accountability that Compstat places on district commanders. In fact, directed patrols with a contingency for foot patrols, was the main strategy of choice selected by commanders.

Ongoing follow-ups and assessment of tactics is also an important component of the Compstat process. Research indicats that follow-up in Lowell, Minneapolis, and Newark was not as intensive as in New York. Most follow-up relied upon the use of crime statistics to determine whether a crime activity and stopped or diminished. If a crime pattern disappeared, it was considered resolved. This process falls short of evidence-based practices that determining how strategic “interventions work, under what circumstances, with what effort, and for how long” (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, 2003). As a result, officers generally had to resort to their impressions of what appeared to have worked in the past.

Most of the problem-solving approaches identified at Comstat relied on traditional strategies:

- Asking patrol officers to identify suspects
- Special attention patrols
- Area saturation
- Increased traffic enforcement
- Increased spot-checks
- Increased arrests

Compstat was designed as a way to transform sluggish, unresponsive police organizations (in this case NYPD) into focused, efficient, and smart organizations. A great deal of attention has focused on New York and its success at revitalizing its police department and reducing its crime rate. Very little research has examined police organizations outside of New York that have attempted to implement Compstat models. Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd determined a gap “between the theory of a highly focused organizational mission or crime fighting and the reality of a complex mission with a complex set of organizational structures that remained largely at odds with the ostensible simplification of the department’s objective” (2003).

Calls for service make up a large portion of a police department’s workload; a great deal of that workload is not crime-related and does not fit into the criteria of Compstat models. Most police organizations still have to deal with the reality of traditional calls for service that generate work for and utilize the largest portion of police resources. Consequently, police organizations continue to struggle with the ability to be nimble and flexible with resources.

Some elements of Compstat have been successful:

- Technology has enabled police organizations to quickly identify and respond to emerging crime trends
- Accountability components have influenced district commanders to be more knowledgeable and aware of problems within their districts

Other Compstat elements have not been as effective:

- Organizational flexibility is often negatively impacted by over-emphasis on individual command accountability at the expense of teamwork and collaboration
- Problem-solving techniques have been negatively impacted by an over emphasis on accountability that falls back on traditional police responses rather than innovation or experimentation
- Limited crime analysis staff, training, and support have resulted in limited rudimentary crime analysis. Technology has been largely limited to the search for criminal hot spots rather than any kind of extensive analysis that attempts to discern root causes from emerging patterns
- Follow-up is largely left incomplete making it difficult to accurately determine the effectiveness of police problem-solving techniques or responses

In summary, despite what appear to be impressive results in New York, Compstat has not revolutionized the way police organizations conduct business. Instead, Compstat has offered some new ways of doing business. Change is occurring, but at a much slower, evolving pace than stated by many Compstat advocates. Individual police organizations must do their best to balance resources to meet the complex and competing needs of crime reduction and other calls for public service that are currently the responsibility of the police. Trade-offs and compromise are a necessary component of that balance.